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Abstract
This paper describes a new steganography algorithm based on a steerable pyramid transform
of a digital image and the steganalysis of the existence of secret messages hidden by this new
method. The data embedding process uses the elements of a Lee and Chen steganography
algorithm which is adapted to the steerable pyramid transform domain. This article describes
the Fisher Linear Disriminant (FLD) analysis and its steganalysis application, too. The
main part of the paper is the description of the conducted research and the results of FLD
steganalysis of stegoimages produced by the new steganography algorithm.
1. Introduction
Steganography is a modern and dynamically developing part of information
security which protects information by its hidding. Secure communication with
steganography has been known since ancient times when slaves’ heads were
shaved and tatooed to hide some information [1, 2]. When the hair grew up,
the message could be delivered. Today steganography has got many different
ways to hide information.
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Almost all communication channels are digital and many different kinds of
data are saved in a digital form i.e.: music, pictures and movies. Digital record-
ing has very useful features for steganography. The first of them is high quality
which assures that the information may be equally reconstructed even when
it is partially destructed during transmission. The second one is a high time
unvariability, even if the digital media were played many times. And, finally,
digital data in many cases are redundant, i.e. wave music consists of frequen-
cies not heard to human ear which is utilised during mp3 compression. The
redundant data may be replaced by secret information using the steganography
algorithm, too.
Our research is concentrated on developing the most secure and efficient
steganography method [3, 4, 5, 6] with digital image as a cover of the secret
information. To reach this purpose, we have prepared a new steganography
algorithm which hides data into digital images. This algorithm was developed
during the research done for the PhD dissertation [7] and was described there
in more detail. This algorithm possesses interesting features e.g. low cover
image destruction and resistance to statistical steganalysis with Fisher Linear
Discriminant.
2. Steerable pyramid transformation
The proposed stego-algorithm is based on a steerable pyramid transforma-
tion of a digital image [8, 9, 10]. In this linear multiresolution the image
decomposition is subdivided into a collection of subbands localised in scale and
orientation. The subbands have octave bandwidth and orientation bandwidth
of 2pi/m where m is an integer. Each next scale level is computed recursively
using convolution and decimation operations.
This transform has some advantages compared to the wavelet transform
which is the most known and frequently used method of multiresolution de-
composition. The advantages of this representation are that [10]:
1. Subbands are translation– and rotation–invariant,
2. Subbands on each scale level are localised in many orientations (up to 85
with transform implementation used for our research),
3. No aliasing in transformation subbands so the subband coefficients are not
altered,
4. Overcompletness which gives more space for information hidding and re-
quires more time to extract the hidden data.
The steerable pyramid diagram is shown in Fig. 1a. The filters construct-
ing the steerable pyramid are represented as rectangular blocks. Blocks with
the symbol H represent non–oriented highpass filters, blocks with the symbol
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L lowpass filters (L1 are the narrowband filters) and blocks with the sybmol
B bandpass filters. The diagram represents the first scale level of the decom-
position only. We can get higher scale levels of the decomposition after the
recursive including the dashed line around the part of the diagram into the ex-
tension point where the input image is after lowpass filtering and decimation.
The recursion constraint is:
|L1(ω/2)|2 = |L1(ω/2)|2
(|L1(ω)|2 + |B(ω)|2) .
We can describe the system response in the frequency domain as follows:
Xˆ (−→ω ) =
{
|H0 (−→ω ) |2 + |L0 (−→ω ) |2
(
|L1 (−→ω ) |2 +
n∑
k=0
|Bk (ω) |2
)}
X (−→ω ) + a,
where a indicates the aliasing term which is eliminated by L1 filter. This
elimination is achieved thanks to that L1(ω) = 0 for |ω| > pi/2.
The decomposition subbands are polar–separable in the Fourier domain. The
frequency tiling of the single stage for two of the badbass filters are shown in
the Fourier magnitude spectrum in Fig. 1b. The subbands of the two–level and
four–direction transform of the sample image are shown in Fig. 1c.
The bandpass filters of the transformation are highly constrained. Their
Fourier transform radial component must obey a recursive system diagram re-
quirement and the angular component is constrained by the property of steer-
ability [11]. The steerability term means that we can synthesize any direction
filter by linear combination of a few basis filters. Each filter from the basis is
a rotated copy of each other.
In our case, the steerable basis is a set of n+ 1 nth–order directional deriva-
tives of a circular symmetric function. The Fourier magnitude of the i–th
oriented bandpass filter can be written in the polar–separable form:
Bi (
−→ω ) = A (θ − θi)B (ω) ,
where θ = tan−1 (ωy/ωx), θi = 2pi/m and ω = |−→ω |.
A directional derivative operation in the spatial domain corresponds to the
multiplication by a linear ramp function in the frequency domain. We can write
a derivative operator in the x direction in the polar coordinates as follows:
−jωx = −jω cos (θ) .
As the factor ω is reduced by a radial portion of the function derivative
operator is thus cos (θ). We can get higher order directional derivatives by
multiplication a ramp raised to a power and the angular portion of the filter is
cos (θ)n, where n is the order of the derivative.
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Fig. 1. Steerable pyramid transform: a) – the transformation filter structure, b) – the
Fourier magnitude spectum with marked frequencies passed by the filters B0 and B1,
c) – two levels of a sample image decomposition with four filtering directions
The steerable pyramid transform has another important feature for steganog-
raphy. This is a flat system response, which can be described response as fol-
lows:
|H0 (ω) |2 + |L0 (ω) |2
(|L1 (ω) |2 + |B (ω) |2) = 1.
It means that the output image after the decomposition into subbands and
reverse composition is the same as the input image.
3. Steganographic algorithm
Our steganographic algorithm is composed of a steerable transformation of
the cover image and Lee and Chen steganography method [12] hidding secret
message bits through the average values of image pixel blocks modification.
The Lee and Chen algorithm was adapted to a new domain as can be seen in
Fig. 2. The original method was prepared for grayscale images in the spatial
domain. In our case some elements of this algorithm were used for RGB colour
space images in the transform domain.
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At the beginning of the steganography process the cover image is decomposed
into a steerable pyramid transformation. The parameters of the transformation,
i.e. the number of the scale decomposition levels and the number of different
directions of image filtering are parts of stegokey which is needed to extract
the hidden message. After that we get a set of different scale subbands and
we can choose one to hide information in it. This is the first step shown in
the algorithm diagram and the chosen subband index is the second part of the
stegokey.
Fig. 2. Steganographic algorithm
The next coefficients of the subband are divided into equal size square blocks.
The size of blocks is another part of the stegokey. The average value for each
block is calculated and an algorithm begins the stegotable generation. A ste-
gotable is a table of average value subranges covering all ranges of average values
calculated for all blocks and pseudo random generated bit values ascribed to
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them. The pseudo random generator’s seed and number of subranges are the
parts of the stegokey.
The final part of the algorithm is the message embedding. The average value
for each coefficient block falls into one of the stegotable subranges and since then
the block represents bit value ascribed to this subrange. If the next message bit
which we want to hide in the block is equal to the value ascribed to this block,
the algorithm modifies the average value into the center value of the stegotable
subrange. If these values are different the algorithm changes the average value
of the block to the center value of the neighbour stegotable subrange with the
equal bit value. The hidden message is destruction resistant unless the average
value is modified too much and remains in the same stegotable subrange.
The message is repeated many times during the hidding process to utilise all
the coefficient blocks. If all the blocks are modified, the steganography process
is harder to detect in a simple manner. The redundance is very important
for the message extraction process, too, because the composition of the output
image from many transform subbands made distortions into the average values
of the coefficients. When the message is extracted by the message recipient,
it is the averaged form of many instances to assure right extraction. The bit
messages hidden in the three–colour band subbands are averaged, too. Thanks
to that we get the simplest error correction based on the Hamming distance
[13].
To assure the security of the secret information hidden into the image, the
message is preprocessed by a bit permutation with a secret key which is the
next part of the stegokey. The message may be encrypted and supplemented
with the correction bits but it does not assure the steganographic security.
By steganographic security we mean that the message remains undetectable.
When the modification is detected by a steganaliser, he may try to destroy the
embedded message or to stop the secret communication channel.
This new steganographic algorithm was tested with the RGB images of
256× 256 pixels resolution and allows us to hide up to about 300 bits of secret
information. The distortions made during the steganographic process are quite
small SNR ≈ 39dB and in many cases lower those made by other stegano-
graphic tools like EzStego [14] or F5 [15]. The embedding methods result in
the resistance of the hidden information (it must be short, about 70 bits) to
JPEG compression with a quality factor of 100%, too. It means that the input
image is loss compressed with the ratio of 3:1 to 4:1 [7].
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4. Fisher Linear Discriminant Steganalysis
Many steganalysis methods are built as the answers to the particular stegano-
graphic algorithms and they detect typical different steganography methods
data modification [16, 17, 18]. We have developed a new information hidding
algorithm. However the corresponding steganalysis method does not exist yet.
If we want to test the hidden data security we must perform the blind steganal-
ysis process (blind means that we do not know what steganographic technique
was used). We should carry out blind steganalysis along with the statistical
analysis because the information hidding disturbs the stastistics of the image
[18].
Many steganalysis researchers believe that a good method for blind steganal-
ysis was developed by Farid [19, 20]. This technique is based on Fisher Linear
Discriminant Analysis (FLD) [21]. The Farid research shows that this algo-
rithm is useful for steganalysis images stegoed by the classic steganography
tools like Jpeg-Jsteg [22] and OutGuess [23].
The FLD algorithm classifies the objects into separate classes on the basis
of their chosen features [24]. In the simplest case it recognises the objects
belonging to two classes (Fig. 3).
The steganalysis target is to find that the particular image belongs to the
class of stego–modified images or the class of untouched images. Classification
features in the Farid’s steganalysis method are higher–order image statistics.
At the beginning of the method, the statistic features from the training sets
are collected. The first set includes the natural images set and the second
modified ones. Then the algorithm looks for the deviation from these models
to determine a threshold between two feature classes. Then this threshold is
used to classify novel images.
As there exist strong high-order statistical regularities within a wavelet-like
decomposition of natural images [21], the statistics are collected from the co-
efficients of the image decomposition with Quadrature Mirror Filters (QMFs)
[25, 26]. The decomposition splits the frequency space of the image into mul-
tiple scales and three orientations: vertical, horizontal and diagonal.
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Fig. 3. Fisher Linear Discriminant analysis of the objects belonging to one of the two
classes
The first statistic set is composed of mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis
of subband coefficients at each scale and orientation. The second statistics set
is based on errors in an optimal linear predictor of a coefficient value. The
subband coefficients are corelated to their spatial and scale neighbours. This
fact allows to construct a predictor for the magnitude of coefficients in a subset
of neighbours. The predictors for vertical (V ), horizontal (H) and diagonal (D)
bands and scale i can be described as follows:
Vi(x, y) = w1Vi(x− 1, y) + w2Vi(x+ 1, y) + w3Vi(x, y − 1) + w4Vi(x, y + 1)
+ w5Vi−1(x/2, y/2) + w6Di(x, y) + w7Di−1(x/2, y/2)
Vi(x, y) = w1Hi(x− 1, y) + w2Hi(x+ 1, y) + w3Hi(x, y − 1) + w4Hi(x, y + 1)
+ w5Hi−1(x/2, y/2) + w6Di(x, y) + w7Di−1(x/2, y/2)
Di(x, y) = w1Di(x− 1, y) + w2Di(x+ 1, y) + w3Di(x, y − 1) + w4Di(x, y + 1)
+ w5Di−1(x/2, y/2) + w6Hi(x, y) + w7Vi(x, y)
We can express the predictor in a matrix form (example for the vertical band):
~V =Q~w.
The coefficients are determined by a minimizing quadrature error function:
E (~ω) =
[
~V −Q~w
]
.
This minimization is calculated by differentiating with respect to w, setting the
result equal to zero:
dE (~ω)
d~ω
= 2QT
[
~V −Q~ω
]
= 0.
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The solvation vector is:
~ω =
(
QTQ
)−1
QT ~V
and the error in the linear predictor can be described as:
~E = log2
(
~V
)
− log2 (|Q~ω|) .
The second set of statistics: mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis is col-
lected from this linear prediction error. This calculation is performed for all
decomposition subbands for all scales and orientations. These statistics are
combined with the coefficient statistics and results with 24(n − 1) statistics
feature vector which is used for discrimination between classes.
When the features are collected fom two training sets, the FLD calssification
process begins. At the beginning the classification algorithm calculates within–
class means for the two classes from the testing sets. These means are defined
as:
~µx =
1
Nx
Nx∑
i=1
~xi, and ~µy =
1
Ny
Ny∑
j=1
~yj
where:~xi, i = 1, . . . , Nx and ~yj , j = 1, . . . , Ny are the examples from the two
classes in the training sets. The second step is the determination of between–
class mean:
~µ =
1
Nx +Ny
 Nx∑
i=1
~xi +
Ny∑
j=1
~yj
 .
Then the within–class Sw and between–class Sb scater matrices are calculated:
Sw =MxM
T
x +MyM
T
y ,
Sb = Nx (µx − µ) (µx − µ)T +Ny (µy − µ) (µy − µ)T
where: the i–th column of matrix Mx contains the zero–meaned ith example
given by ~xi − ~µx. Similarly j–th column of matrix My is defined.
Let ~e be the maximal generalized eigenvalue–eigenvector of Sw and Sb. At
the end the training examples are projected onto the one–dimensional linear
subspace defined by ~e (i.e. xTi e and y
T
j e). During this process the within–class
scatter is minimized and the between–class scatter is maximized.
When the projection axis is determined, as can the seen in Fig. 3, a novel
example from the testing set is classified by projection onto the same subspace
(i.e. ~zT~e).
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5. Research results
Farid in [21] describes the results of steganalysis with the two–class FLD.
The steganalysis program was trained with the training set consisting of 1800
unmodified images cropped into 640× 480 pixel area and random subset of the
1800 stegoed images with a varing message size and the same size. Steganogra-
phy was performed with Jsteg, OutGuess, EzStego and by substitution of LSB.
The classification accuracy for the tested tools and the message size 256× 256
were quite large: 94% for the Jsteg stegoed images and 92.8% for OutGuess
without statistical correction (option of the tool). For EzStego and LSB the
message size was 194 × 194 and the accuracy was lower: 45.2% and 42.3%
respectively.
In our case, the new steganography algorithm described above was tested by
hidding binary messages within the RGB images of resolution 256× 256. This
type of stegoimage was used to verify steganalysis resistance, too.
Two training sets were prepared, too. The first of them included 400 un-
touched images and the second was the same set of images but modified stegano-
graphically. Different values of steganographic algorithm parameters were set
during the preparation of the image set. For example, the number of stegotable
subranges or the size of coefficient block used to hide one message bit.
Fig. 4. Sample images: a) – from the training set, b) – from the testing set
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The testing group had 50 untouched images and 50 modified images of the
same parameters like images from the training sets. The sources of the testing
images were FreeFoto [27] web photobase and cropped center parts of pictures
taken with the Fuji FinePix 5500 digital camera. The examples of images are
shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 5. Scatter plots of tested images from two classes: untouched image class and
stegoed image class
The conducted steganalysis of images stegoed with the new stego–algorithm
has shown that the Farid method with the mentioned assumptions (i.e. an
image size and quantities of image sets) has not detected any steganographical
modifications.
The result of the classification of stegoed images as the images after mod-
ification amounts to 0.67% of the tested images only and the result of the
classification of untouched images as the images without modification amounts
to 98.67% of the tested images. These very good results come from the fact
that the features of images from both classes overlap which can be seen on the
scatter plots in Fig. 5. It means that the right discrimination is impossible in
this case.
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 20:49:56
UM
CS
72 Piotr Kopniak
6. Conclusions
We have developed a new steganographic method with a digital image as an
information cover and based on a steerable pyramid transform. The information
embedding part of the algorithm is a steganography method developed by Lee
and Chen tailored to the transform domain. The new method hides about 300
bits of information into 256× 256 size colour image with minimal cover image
distortions (SNR ≈ 39dB) and prevents from the resistance of short (about 70
bits) hidden messages to the JPEG compression with the quality factor 100%
and noise adding [7].
This method is resistant to statistic steganalysis with FLD proposed by Farid.
This fact results from a minimal data modification and an overlapping class of
features taken from untouched and stegoed images.
Our future research will be concentrated on testing the FLD classification
with larger image sets and the utilisation of different size covers. Different
statistical steganalitic methods, for example Support Vector Machines (SVM)
will be verified too.
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